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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DONALD L. STEADMAN and
DONNA B. STEADMAN,
his wife, and
NORMA E. STEADMAN,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

LAKE HILLS, a corporation, and
M. M. MERRILL, and LESTER
M. JOHNSON and JOHNSON
ENTERPRISES, INC., successors
in interest,
Defendants-Appellants

Case No.
10779

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by respondents for foreclosure
of a mortgage instituted and tried in 1961 and reopened in 1965 for determination of respondents'
right to attorney's fees.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After the trial in December, 1961 judgment of
"no cause for action" was rendered against re-
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spondents. Five years later the lower court heard
evidence on the issue of attorney's fees pursuant to
a nunc pro tune order and rendered judgment for
respondents for attorney's fees in the amount of
$3,500.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the lower court's
Judgment of September 26, 1966 awarding $3,500.00
attorney's fees to respondents and their attorneys.
Appellants also seek a reversal of the lower
court's Order Nunc Pro Tune of October 19, 1966
amending the minute entry of December 15, 1961,
to reserve the issue of attorney's fees for trial.
Appellants further seek a reversal of the lower
court's Order of October 19, 1966 denying appellants' Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and for
a New Trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 15, 1954 Lake Hills, a Utah nonprofit
corporation, executed a note and mortgage to respondents in the amount of $142,200.00 providing
for payments of $15,800.00 each April 15th thereafter. (R. 4-6.) As of the same date an escrow arrangement was agreed to by the parties under which
a warranty deed from appellant Lake Hills to respondents was deposited with Walker Bank & Trust
Company. Under the terms of the escrow Lake Hills
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was to make annual payments of $15,800.00 on each
April 15th thereafter until $142,200.00 plus interest
was paid. The escrow instruction provided that if
Lake Hills failed to pay any of the installments when
due, "or within thirty days thereafter," then Walker
Bank should deliver the warranty deed to respondents, upon their demand. ( R. 68-69.)
All payments of the annual installments from
April 15, 1955 through April 15, 1960 were made
to the escrow agent and disbursed by it to respondents. (R. 69.) No payments were ever made directly
to respondents under the note and mortgage and
no objection or demand was ever made by respondents to this procedure.
On April 20, 1961 respondents commenced this
action against Lake Hills to foreclose the mortgage
of April 15, 1954, alleging default of the April 15,
1961 installment and nonpayment of taxes on the
mortgaged premises for the years 1955 through
1960. (R. 1-3.)
The installment due April 15, 1961 was paid
to the escrow agent on May 12, 1961 under the terms
of the escrow allowing a thirty-day grace period.
( R. 69.) Disbursement by the escrow agent was
apparently refused by respondents since the escrow
agent held this installment until after the trial.
The answer of Lake Hills to respondents' complaint alleged payment of the 1961 installment and
abatement of the taxes that were allegedly unpaid.
(R. 12.)
The case went to trial on December 7, 1961
before Judge Marcellus K. Snow. It was shown that
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the 1961 installment had been paid within the grace
period provided in the escrow agreement, that the
taxes for 1955, 1956 and 1957 had been abated by
Salt Lake County, and that the taxes for 1958, 1959
and 1960 had been paid by Lake Hills under protest.
( R. 70.) The case was taken under advisement by
the court and judgment rendered on December 15,
1961 as shown by the minute entry in the Register
of Actions of that date, which reads as follows:
The above entitled case having been taken
under advisement.
Whereupon the Court having considered
and now being fully advised in the premises,
finds that upon receipt by the Plaintiff of the
check in the amount of Fifteen Thousand
Eight Hundred Dollars ($15,800.00) now
held in trust, the Court orders judgment entered in favor of the Defendants and each of
them as "no cause for action". The Court further orders said check be delivered within
thirty (30) days. (R. 48)
The installment paid to the escrow agent on May
12, 1961 and held in trust by it pending trial was
disbursed to respondents on January 3, 1962. (R.
70.)

It appears that no formal findings of fact, conclusions of law or judgment were ever signed or entered in the case because of failure of the parties to
agree to findings in accordance with the court's decision of December 15, 1961. ( R. 100. ) Some proposals for findings were subrni tted by the parties
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but because no agreement could be reached, the matter was dropped.
No further action in the case was taken until
April of 1966. Both parties relied on the decision
of December 15, 1961 as reflected in the minute entry. This is shown by the fact that the installments
due in each of the following years were paid by Lake
Hills, or its successors L. N. Johnson and Johnson
Enterprises, Inc., to the escrow agent and were disbursed to and accepted by respondents without objection or claim that any more was due. (R. 71-72.)
On September 10, 1964 appellants Lester N.
Johnson and Johnson Enterprises, Inc. became successors in interest to appellant Lake Hills pursuant
to an Arrangement under Chapter XI of the Federal
Bankruptcy Act. The 1964 and 1965 installments
due under the note, mortgage and escrow arrangement were paid to the escrow agent and disbursed
to respondents. (R. 71-72.)
The final installment under the note, mortgage
and escrow arrangement was due April 15, 1966.
However, on April 12, 1966 an Amended and Supplemental Complaint was filed by respondents setting out issues that had been settled in the trial of
December 7, 1961, claiming that $5,000.00 attorney's
fees should be awarded, and seeking to enjoin the
escrow agent from accepting the final installment
payment. ( R. 50-52.) This was the first action taken
01· notice given by respondents claiming any right
to attorney's fees since the trial of 1961.
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Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties
appellants paid $5,000.00 into court pending the
outcome of this new claim, and the note and mortgage were paid in full. ( R. 53-55, 73.)
On September 23, 1966 the matter of attorney's
fees in this foreclosure action was heard by District
Judge A. H. Ellett, a different Judge than the one
that originally heard the case. Judgment was rendered from the bench against appellants in the amount
of $3,500.00. (R. 126.) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment were signed and entered
Septmeber 26, 1966 (R. 75-78) and a Motion to
Amend Findings of Fact and for a New Trial was
filed on September 29, 1966. (R. 79-81.) This motion was heard and denied by the court on October
4, 1966. ( R. 84-85.)
Then it appears that counsel for respondents
decided that the judgment for attorney's fees entered September 26, 1966 might not be valid because
it was contrary to the judgment rendered in December of 1961 of "no cause for action". Therefore an
Order Nunc Pro Tune was prepared and presented
to Judge Snow, who originally heard the case, and
on ex pa rte motion of counsel for respondents the
order was signed and entered on October 19, 1966
amending nunc pro tune the minute entry of December 15, 1961 to reserve the issue of attorney's fees
for trial. ( R. 82-83.)
On or about November 2, 1966 respondents received $3,500.00 from the clerk of the court in satisfaction of the amount awarded to them. Thereafter
this appeal was taken.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENTS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ATTORNEY'S FEES FROM APPELLANTS WHEN
THEY HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
THEM. THE COURT'S ORIGINAL RULING OF
"NO CAUSE FOR ACTION" WAS CONCLUSIVE
ON THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
WAS PROPERLY MADE BECAUSE THE ACTION WAS PREMATURE.
This is a highly unusual case in which, after
all the issues had been settled in a trial, the case
was reopened nearly five years later at the instance
of the losing parties to determine their right to attorney's fees. Overlooking the original five-year-old
decision the court, in the person of a different judge,
made only a determination of the reasonableness of
the attorney's fee it awarded without making a determination of a right to that fee. It will be shown
that the court's original decision was conclusive on
this issue and that the court's later consideration
and determination of the case was not only irregular but reversible error.
After the trial on the merits of this case in December, 1961, the court rendered judgment against
respondents of "no cause for action". Respondents
do not dispute this ruling of the court yet they claim
a right to attorney's fees under that cause of action.
Attorney's fees are not taxable against either party
to an action unless provided by statute or by contract. And, even if so provided, they are not taxable
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unless the party seeking them prevails in the case.
If he has no right of action, why should he be entitled to attorney's fees for pursuing a right he does
not have?
It has already been stated that respondents do
not dispute the court's ruling of "no cause for action". However, it is apparent from the record that
this ruling of the court was correct and supported
by the evidence. Respondents' suit for foreclosure
was based upon nonpayment of the 1961 installment
and of the taxes for 6 years. Neither of these claims
was valid.
The parties entered into two separate arrangements to insure payment of the $142,200.00 debt due
from Lake Hills to respondents. First, a note and
mortgage were executed and delivered. Second, an
escrow agreement was signed providing a thirtyday grace period for the annual installments. It is
indisputable that all payments made on the debt
prior to the commencement of this action were made
through the escrow agent and it was expected that
all future payments would be made in the same
way. Otherwise, the escrow agent, not having received an annual installment, could have delivered
the deed to the mortgaged premises to respondents
even though the annual installment had been paid
directly to respondents. This, of course, was not
the intent of the parties. Therefore, having intended
that all payments were to be made to the escrow
agent under the terms of the escrow agreement, the
parties cannot dispute the applicability of the thirtyday grace period in the escrow agreement. Any pay-
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ment of the 1961 installment to the escrow agent
within thirty days of April 15, 1961 would be in
compliance with the agreement of the parties. Any
action to foreclose the mortgage instituted before
the expiration date of that grace period would be
premature. The 1961 installment was received by
the escrow agent on May 12, 1961, which was within the grace period. This action was commenced on
April 20, 1961 and therefore the action was not
only premature but was bound to fail on the merits
because there was no default in the payments. This
was the position of the court in ruling that there
was "no cause for action". This was apparently also
the opinion of the court at the later hearing of
September 23, 1966. The court then expressed its
opinion, on page 125 of the record, that receipt of
the 1961 installment "would do away with this cause
of action".
The second alleged ground for institution of the
foreclosure action by respondents was the nonpayment of taxes on the mortgaged premises. It is clear
from the record that there was no obligation to pay
the taxes for 1955, 1956 and 1957 because they had
been abated by Salt Lake County on June 25, 1958,
long before this action was commenced. It is difficult
to see why respondents assert the nonpayment of
taxes for these years as grounds for foreclosure, especially after the court ruled against them in December, 1961. The abatement of these taxes removed
the lien for these taxes from the mortgaged premises
and vitiated any obligation of any party to pay the
taxes. It is also clear from the record that proceed-
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ings were underway for abatement of the taxes for
1958, 1959 and 1960, and that eventually these taxes
were paid by Lake Hills under protest. These abatement proceedings precluded the nonpayment of the
taxes from being grounds for foreclosure and the
payment of the taxes under protest further justified
the court's ruling of "no cause for action".
Moreover, the claim of failure to pay the taxes,
even if true, does not give rise to a cause of action
for foreclosure of the mortgage. This is a matter of
contract and unless clearly provided in the mortgage,
there may be no foreclosure for failure to pay taxes.
59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 496, at 800-01 (1949); 37
AM. JUR. Mortgages§ 535, at 35-36 (1941). The
mortgage in this case specifically provides that it
may be foreclosed for failure of the mortgagor to
pay the taxes only if the taxes are "paid by the Mortgagees or their assigns". (R.6.) No claim is made
that respondents ever paid the taxes on behalf of the
mortgagor and it is clear that they did not. The refore there was no cause of action to foreclose the
mortgage on this ground either. Yet Judge Ellett,
who heard the petition for attorney's fees on September 23, 1966, granted the petition solely because he
thought the mortgage could be foreclosed for failure
to pay the taxes. ( R. 126.) As already in di ca ted he
considered the other ground of default in the annual
installment to be invalid. ( R. 125.) Judge Ellet had
probably not read the terms of the mortgage, since
the information on which he based his decision was
given to him orally while on the bench ( R. 98, 104) ,
and therefore he was not aware that the mortgage
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did not allow foreclosure unless respondents had
paid the taxes themselves.
Respondents' claim of default in the annual
installment was decided against them, and properly
so, by both Judge Snow and Judge Ellett. Respondents' claim of failure to pay the taxes was decided
against them by Judge Snow. While this claim was
apparently the basis for Judge Ellett's decision in
favor of respondents, it does not support his decision
and the merits of it were hardly considered by him.
Moreover, there are no findings of fact made by
Judge Ellett to support his judgment for attorney's
fees. His judgment should therefore be reversed.
Judge Snow's decision of "no cause for action" was
a decision that respondents had no right to foreclose the mortgage. How can respondents lose on the
merits and still obtain a judgment for attorney's
fees?
Furthermore, since the right to attorney's fees
in a foreclosure action is a matter of contract, no
right to attorney's fees exists unless specifically provided for in the mortgage. 59 C.J .S. Mortgages§
812a., at 1545 ( 1949). Respondents' claim for attorney's fees must be based on the provision in the
mortgage stating that the mortgagor agrees to pay
a reasonable attorney's fee "in the event of foreclosure." ( R. 6.) The term "foreclosure" means "a termination of all rights of the mortgagor or of his
grantee in the property covered by the mortgage .
. . . It denotes, not the beginning, but the end, of
a procedure adopted by the mortgagee to bar perpetually the rights of the mortgagor, and includes
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the sale itself of the mortgaged property, rather
than the steps preliminary to the sale." 59 C.J.S.
Mortgages§ 482, at 761 (1949); Anderson v. Barr,
-------- Col. ________ , 62 P.2d 1242, 1246, ( 1936). The
commencement of an action to foreclose a mortgage
is not foreclosure, especially when the court finds,
as it did here, that there was no right to foreclosure.
Since there was no "event of foreclosure," this provision of the mortgage has not come into effect and
there is no basis for a claim to attorney's fees.
It does not help respondents' case to claim that
they are entitled to attorney's fees because they were
required to bring the action to enforce payment of
taxes or the annual installment by Lake Hills. Their
action was premature until after the grace period
expired or until they had paid the taxes on behalf
of Lake Hills. Having no right to bring the action,
respondents have no right to penalize appellants by
recovering attorney's fees from them for bringing
the action.

In the later proceedings in this case no attempt
was made by respondents to change the court's ruling
of "no cause for action." Under the circumstances
they had no basis upon which to have this ruling
changed and to proceed with foreclosure. They acquiesce in this ruling of the court and yet insist on
a right to attorney's fees. "No cause for action"
means no cause for any action including one for attorney's fees. The court's original decision is conclusive on all issues and the reopening of the case
itself, as well as the award of attorney's fees, by the
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lower court constitutes error for which it should be
reversed.
POINT II
RESPONDENTS WERE G U I L T Y OF
LACHES IN FAILING TO ASSERT THEIR
CLAIM FOR FOUR-AND-ONE-HALF YEARS
AFTER JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED AND
SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING IT
NOW BECAUSE OF THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF
LATER INSTALLMENTS ON THE MORTGAGE.
This action was commenced in April of 1961
and tried in December of 1961. The trial court rendered a judgment of "no cause for action". If this
judgment had been followed by written findings of
fact and conclusions of law and by a written judgment, there would be no question that respondents'
claim for attorney's fees would have been cut off.
In this case the only evidence of the court's original
judgment is the minute entry in the Register of
Actions. This minute entry is sufficiently detailed
to determine the rights of the parties and should
be considered conclusive. If the minute entry judgment of "no cause for action" is not considered conclusive, then appellants are unfairly deprived of a
written judgment to that effect in this case. The
only reason no written findings or judgment were
signed is because the parties could not agree on
findings of fact. The duty to make findings and
conclusions rests on the court. UTAH R. C1v. P. 52(a).
In this case the court did not make findings and con-
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clusions but suggested that the parties agree between themselves on findings and conclusions for
it to sign ( R. 106). To require the parties to agree
on findings when they are in court because they
disagree seems somewhat ludicrous. Here the parties
could not agree and therefore the court failed in its
duty to make findings and conclusions. This should
not deprive the prevailing party of his right to an
effective and final judgment. The court made its
decision. The decision is clear and should be conclusive.
Notwithstanding this failure to enter a written
judgment, it is contended by appellants that respondents are barred by laches and estoppel from asserting
any claim they might have had for attorney's fees.
This contention is based on ( 1) respondents' long
delay in asserting this claim, ( 2) their acceptance
of subsequent installments under the note and mortgage, and ( 3) the prejudice resulting to the appellants Lester N. Johnson and Johnson Enterprises,
Inc.
At the trial in December, 1961, respondents
made no claim for attorney's fees and offered no evidence to support such a claim. ( R. 122.) This in
itself was a waiver of any right to attorney's fees
since it is necessary in the courts of this state that
an award of attorney's fees be based on evidence
presented at the trial. Utah Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. Nunley, 17 Utah 2d 348, 411 P.2d 838 ( 1966);
F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d
80, 404 P.2d 670 ( 1965). Respondents did not thereafter assert their claim for attorney's fees until
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April 12, 1966, when they filed their Amended and
Supplemental Complaint. It is true that they were
claiming a right to attorney's fees in their proposed
Findings of Fact dated January 15, 1963, but no
action was taken until four-and-one-half years after
the trial. This long delay should be construed as an
implied waiver of any right to attorney's fees, if it
had not already been waived at the trial. The case
was terminated and if a right to attorney's fees
existed, it was an immediate right to be claimed for
services of respondents' attorneys to that point. The
failure to claim that right immediately gave all
parties reason to think that it would not be claimed.
Since the mortgage was not foreclosed, the installments for the following years were still to be
paid. Each of the installments for the years 19621965 were received and accepted by respondents.
No claim or demand that any additional amounts
were due was made during any of these years. Appellants were led to believe that, if any right to attorney's fees ever eixsted, it had been waived. It was
not until the final installment was due in 1966 that
respondents asserted a claim for attorney's fees.
This they did by reviving an action that everyone
had long thought dead. Acceptance of all the intervening installments without complaint was acquiescence in the ruling of "no cause for action" and indicates a waiver of any supposed right to attorney's
fees.
Appellants Lester N. Johnson and Johnson Enterprises, Inc. are successors in interest to the
original mortgagor. In 1964 they took over the re-
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maining obligation under the mortgage relying on
the fact that all installments up until that time had
been paid and that their obligation under the mortgage would be limited to the future installments.
They had no knowledge of a claim for attorney's
fees. Respondents and their attorneys participated in
the federal court proceedings in which Johnson and
Johnson Enterprises took over the mortgage. They
made no claim or demand in those proceedings or
directly to Johnson for attorney's fees that might
be due under the mortgage. This would have been
the proper time to do so and yet all parties concerned
were apparently relying on the original ruling of
"no cause for action" in the foreclosure proceeding.
Lester N. Johnson and Johnson Enterprises accepted the obligation of the future installments
under the mortgage without any knowledge of a
claim for attorney's fees. Such knowledge may have
induced them to take a different course of action.
They changed their position in reliance upon the
facts as they existed at that time, or as they were
presented to them. This later claim to attorney's fees
from appellants results in prejudice to them because
they had changed their position and the failure of
respondents to assert their claim before appellants'
change of position should bar them from asserting
their claim afterwards.
It makes little difference whether this contention is based on waiver, estoppel or laches. All three
are variations of the same thing and the basis of all
three appears in this case. Waiver is usually defined
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as the voluntary relinquishment of a known right
and may be implied from a party's course of conduct which evidences an intention to waive his rights.
BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY, at 1752 (4th ed. 1951).
Estoppel precludes one from asserting a claim
because his own actions, or silence when there is a
duty to speak, have led another to change his position. Laches has been termed delay for such a time
as to constitute acquiescence, Mary Jane Stevens Co.
v. First Nat'l Bldg. Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P.2d 1099,
1125 ( 1936), or "delay that works a disadvantage
to another." Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142,
232 P.2d 769, 773 (1961).
Waiver does not require the party asserting it
to change his position to his prejudice. Therefore,
respondents' failure to assert their claim at the trial
or offer evidence to support their claim, their failure
to assert their claim during the federal court proceedings, their delay of four-and-one-half years before finally asserting their claim, and their acceptance of all installments under the mortgage is a
course of conduct evidencing an intention to waive
their claim. This establishes implied waiver. Adding
to this course of conduct the fact that appellants have
changed their position to their prejudice because of
respondents' silence when they had a duty to speak,
also establishes grounds for estoppel. Their delay
for four-and-one-half years has worked a disadvantage to appellants and is sufficiently long to constitute acquiescence. They are therefore also guilty
of laches.
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POINT III
THE ENTRY OF THE NUNC PRO TUNC
ORDER AFTER FIVE YEARS OF DELAY
WITHOUT A SHOWING OF CLERICAL ERROR
AND UPON EX PARTE APPLICATION BY RESPONDENTS WAS IRREGULAR, INVALID
AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE
COURT.
Realizing that the court's original ruling of "no
cause for action" probably disposed of their claim
for attorney's fees, respondents applied to the court
for a nunc pro tune order amending the original
ruling to reserve the issue of attorney's fees for trial.
The record indicates that this application was made
ex parte without notice to appellants and that the
order was signed without any kind of a hearing or
showing of error in the original ruling. It is admitted
that under certain limited circumstances a nunc
pro tune order is proper to correct clerical errors in
a prior order of the court. However, the change made
by the nunc pro tune order in this case was not made
to correct a clerical error. It made a substantial
change in the rights of the parties, allowing respondents a right to attorney's fees where none existed before.
The purpose and limitations on the use of the
nunc pro tune order are explained in the following
quotation from 30A AM. JUR. Judgments § 606, at
587-88 (1958):
... the general rule is that a court may
not, under the form of an amendment of its
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records, revise or change the judgment in substance for the purposes of correcting an error
of law contained therein, or of recording a
judgment that was never in fact rendered,
and of having such judgment entered nunc
pro tune. In this connection, it has been declared that the power to amend should not
be confounded with the power to create, that
the office of entering, and the power to enter,
a judgment nunc pro tune are restricted to
placing upon the record evidence of judicial
action which has actually been taken, and that
the correction of the record of a judgment
by amendment and the entry of such amendment nunc pro tune presuppose a judgment
actually rendered at the proper time. Under
this rule, the amendment or nunc pro tune
entry may not be made to supply a judicial
omission or an error of the court, or to show
what the court might or should have decided,
or intended to decide, as distinguished from
what it actually did decide. The authority of
the court in this connection does not extend
beyond the power to make the journal entry
speak the truth, and may be exercised only to
supply omissions in the exercise of functions
which are clerical merely.
That the foregoing rule is also the rule in Utah
is established by decisions of this court. In Frost v.
District Court of First Judicial District, 96 Utah
106, 83 P.2d 737 (1938), it was held that a nunc
pro tune order four years after judgment correcting
the years of priority of water rights was error.
The changes made were "substantial and not clerical" and "the court was without power to make
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changes other than merely clerical ones after the
expiration of the term of court in which the judgment was entered." The court at page 740 quoted
with approval from 1 FREEMAN, JUDGEMENTS § 141
(5th ed.) as follows:
... the law does not authorize the correction of judicial errors, however flagrant
and glaring they may be, under the pretense
of correcting clerical errors.
. . . The court cannot under the guise
of correcting its record put upon it an order
or judgment it never made or rendered, or
add something to either which was not originally included although it might and should
have so ordered or adjudged in the first instance. It cannot thus repair its own lapses
and omissions to do what it could legally and
properly have done at the right time. A court's
mistake in leaving out of its decision something which it ought to have put in, and something in issue of which it intended but failed
to dispose, is a judicial error, not a mere
clerical misprision, and cannot be corrected by
adding to the entered judgment the omitted
matter on the theory of making the entry conform to the actual judgment rendered.

Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28
(1962), was a case where the lower court signed a
nunc pro tune order allowing a motion for new trial
to be filed even though more than ten days had
elapsed after judgment. This court granted a writ
of prohibition, stating at page 30:
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We are not unmindful of the fact that in
proper circumstances where the interests of
justice so require, the court has power to act
nunc pro tune, that is, to do an act upon one
date and make it effective as of a prior date.
It is recognized that clerical errors may be
corrected or omissions supplied so the record
will accurately reflect that which in fact took
place. However, this device cannot properly be
used in the manner resorted to here to revive
the time for taking a required step in a legal
proceeding after the statutory time for doing
it had elapsed....
It is clear from the foregoing that in order for

the order entered in this case to be proper, the court
must have actually reserved the issue of attorney's
fees for later trial at the time of its decision in 1961.
That the court might have or should have reserved
this issue, or intended to but failed to reserve this
issue, would not justify its order. It must have actually reserved the issue at the time. The nunc pro
tune order would then be proper to correct the "clerical" error in recording the court's decision.
The court quite obviously did not originally reserve the issue of attorney's fees because it was not
even brought before it. No evidence was offered on
the issue ( R. 122) and therefore no ruling was made
concerning it. It is unlikely that the court or either
of the parties intended to reserve the issue of attorney's fees for two reasons. First, when the court
rules against one party, it will not ordinarily also
rule that he is entitled to attorney's fees for his losing
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effort. Nor will either of the parties expect it. Second, in the usual case all issues will be disposed of
at the same hearing. No reason appears why this
should not be the case here. Both parties, as well as
the court, would be interested in having all issues
heard at the same time. If for some reason separate
hearings were contemplated, the record would show
it. At the very least a date would have been set for
the later hearing. That respondents did not think
that the issue of attorney's fees had been reserved
clearly appears from the proposed findings of fact
prepared by their attorney. (R. 41-42.) These proposed findings make no mention of a reservation of
the issue of attorney's fees. If the issue had been
reserved, it would have been to respondents' advantage to so state. Yet paragraph 13 proposes a
certain sum as a reasonable attorney's fee as if no
later hearing was contemplated.
It is only reasonable to assume that, after a
ruling of "no cause for action," no one thought the
issue of attorney's fees could or should be considered.
This was clearly an afterthought of respondents.
The record does not show that the issue was
originally reserved and it is illogical to assume that
it was. Therefore a nunc pro tune order is improper.
The proper procedure to obtain a nunc pro tune order
would have been to set a hearing before Judge Snow,
who originally heard the case, and give notice to all
parties concerned. Then the judge would have the
benefit of both sides of the case and would not be
relying on the representations of the party seeking
the order. After a delay of five years it is unlikely
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that the judge could remember the details of this case
out of the hundreds that had come before him.
Moreover, since the minute entry showed a ruling
of "no cause for action," the nunc pro tune order
was contrary to the record and the judge's memory
should not be relied upon.
Whether or not notice to the parties concerned
is necessary before a nunc pro tune can be entered
has been considered by various courts in the past.
While these decisions vary according to the facts
involved, they have been summarized in Annotation,
14 A.L.R.2d 224 ( 1950). The author of that annotation states at page 229 that the courts are not inclined to dispense with notice where the error to
be corrected "is considered to be judicial or substantial, or where the correction is sought to be made
after the expiration of the term at which the original judgment was rendered, or where the error can
be established only by evidence outside the record .
. . . " The author goes on to state that better practice would "require notice wherever a party would
be in a less favorable position after the correction has
been made than he was under the judgment as originally entered, and to dispense with notice only where
the correction is a matter of indifference to the party
not notified."
In the instant case the change was not clerical
but substantial, was made five years later, and the
alleged error does not appear from the record but
could only be established by evidence outside the
record. Appellants are also in a much less favorable
position than under the original judgment which
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would dismiss the whole action on the merits. Notice
should have been given to appellants and evidence
submitted to establish the elleged error. Failure in
both these respects constitutes error for which the
lower court should be reversed.
The lapse of nearly five years between the original ruling and the nunc pro tune order is in itself
grounds for reversing the order. While laches has
been discussed in Point II above, the five-year delay
in seeking the correction is separately asserted here
as grounds for refusing the nunc pro tune order. 30A
AM. JuR. Judgments § 600, at 584 (1958) states:
. . . an unexcused and unexplained delay in seeking the correction of a clerical error
or misprision in the record of a judgment has,
on the ground of laches, brought about a denial of the amendment in sundry instances.
The delay in this case was both unexcused and
unexplained and should bar the nunc pro tune order
on the ground of laches. In this respect this case is
similar to the Kettner case where a nunc pro tune
order overcoming the effect of a lapse of a statutory
period was reversed. Here the period of time involved is not statutory but is sufficiently long to
invoke laches as grounds for reversal.
POINT IV
THE H E A R I N G OF RESPONDENTS'
CLAIM BY A DIFFERENT DIVISION OF THE
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COURT THAN THE ONE THAT ORIGINALLY
HEARD THE CASE WAS IRREGULAR.
As pointed out above Judge Snow presided at
the trial of this action on December 7, 1961, and
after taking the matter under advisement, rendered
a judgment in favor of appellants of "no cause for
action" on December 15, 1961. The only evidence of
this judgment is the minute entry of that date in
the Register of Actions. That minute entry recites
that the payment of the annual installment, having
been held in trust, was to be delivered to respondents.
Judge Snow apparently recognized that the installment had been paid within the grace period and
therefore there was no right to foreclose. Point I
of this argument shows that a ruling of "no cause
for action" could only mean that neither of the
grounds asserted by respondents for foreclosing the
mortgage was valid. Yet, because the court made no
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the basis
for Judge Snow's decision cannot be known.
When respondents' claim for attorney's fees was
heard five years later, almost no consideration at
all was given to the right to foreclose the mortgage.
This later hearing was before Judge Ellett and it
would be understandable if one judge did not want
to question another judge's basis for decision. Yet
the basis of Judge Snow's original decision was important in this later hearing. If there was no right
to foreclose, there was no right to attorney's fees.
Difficult as it might have been for a judge to remember the basis of his decision rendered nearly five
years earlier, only that judge would know that basis
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in the absence of written findings. The trial of different issues in the same action before different
judges is irregular, especially when all of the issues
may have been considered and disposed of by the
first judge. The matter of attorney's fees should have
been brought before Judge Snow. Failure to do so
was an irregularity for which the lower court should
be reserved.
POINT V
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RESPONDENTS
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS REQUIRED
BY LAW.
The lower court, in awarding attorney's fees
to respondents, made only one finding of fact. That
finding states that $3500.00 is a reasonable attorney's fee. (R. 77.) There is no finding that appellants were in default under the mortgage to justify
the bringing of this action. There is no finding that
the mortgage provided for attorney's fees in case
of default. There is no finding that taxes were not
paid on the mortgaged premises. There is no finding
that appellants Lester M. Johnson and Johnson
Enterprises had assumed the obligation of attorney's
fees under the mortgage. There is no finding or
conclusion that respondents did not waive their right
to attorney's fees by accepting subsequent payments
under the mortgage. There is no finding or conclusion that the court had power to award attorney's
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fees when the action had already been tried and
determined adversely to the respondents. This lack
of findings was objected to by appellants in their
motion to Amend Findings of Fact and for a New
Trial, which was denied by the court.
It has been established as fundamental in Utah
that any judgment must be based upon findings of
fact which in turn must be based on the evidence.
This is required by UTAH R. Civ. P. 52(a). It has
also been the holding of numerous cases decided by
this court. LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, _______ _
Utah 2d ________ , 420 P.2d 615 (1966); F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d
670, 673 ( 1965) ; Gaddis Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 3
Utah 2d 43, 278 P.2d 285, 286 (1954); In re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 35, 269 Pac. 103, 109
(1927). As these cases and others cited therein indicate, failure of the court to make findings sufficient
to support the judgment or upon all of the issues
raised by the pleadings is reversible error.
The single finding in this case that $3500.00
is a reasonable attorney's fee is not sufficient to
support a judgment for that fee without additional
findings on all the issues raised by the pleadings.
For the court's failure to do this, it should be reversed.
POINT VI
EVEN IF RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED
TO AN ATTORNEY'S FEE IN THIS CASE, THE
$3500.00 AWARDED BY THE LOWER COURT
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IS AN UNREASONABLE AND UNCONSCIONABLE FEE.
Should it be determined that respondents are
entitled to attorney's fees in this matter, it is submitted by appellants that the amount awarded by the
lower court is not reasonable under the circumstances of this case. The mortgage provides for a
"reasonable" attorney's fee. Even if it provided for
a set sum, the court would be obligated to determine
if that sum were reasonable. Mason v. Mason, 108
Utah 428, 160 P.2d 730, 733 ( 1945). As previously
indicated the court was of the opinion that respondents were entitled to a fee because of the failure to
pay taxes. ( R. 126.) Therefore, no fee should be allowed for any services rendered in connection with
any other alleged grounds for foreclosure. Only those
legitimate services concerning the failure to pay
taxes should be considered. Even though this was
not grounds for foreclosure, as appears in Point
I above, and even though all taxes were abated or
eventually paid, the total amount of unabated
or unpaid taxes at the time suit was commenced,
including interest and penalties, was $2,167.99. This
could be the only amount for which suit could be
brought because the mortgage does not provide for
the acceleration of the principal upon failure to pay
taxes. To award more attorney's fees than the
amount for which suit is brought seems clearly unreasonable. If the Fee Schedule adopted by the Utah
State Bar were followed, the recommended fee in
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a forclosure action based on a delinquency of $2,167. 99 would be $47 4.80. It is therefore submitted
that a fee of $3500.00 is unreasonable.
Moreover, it is submitted that respondents
would be entitled to a fee only for the services of
their attorneys to the time of the original trial in
this action. Testimony was taken at the hearing as
to the amount of time spent by respondents' attorneys. One of those attorneys, however, testified that
this time included the time spent after the trial in
numerous other matters. (R. 109.) Since the taxes
were paid before the trial, no fee should actually
be allowed for services after such payment. If the
principal could not be accelerated for failure to pay
taxes, then the only possible reason for bringing suit
would be to force payment of taxes. Once the taxes
were paid, there would be nothing to try and no
further services were necessary by respondents'
attorneys. Therefore all services rendered in preparing for and participating in the trial should
be excluded. In light of this a $3500.00 attorney's
fee is not reasonable.
It was also testified at the hearing that a considerable amount of time was spent by respondents'
attorneys in researching and briefing issues that
were not involved in this case. (R. 114-15.) The
court's award was based on this time as well as all
other time spent by respondents' attorneys. Only that
amount of time that was legitimately spent by their
attorneys in prosecuting this action on the grounds
upon which they could rightfully bring this action
and prevail, should be considered in determining the
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amount of the fee. There was no breakdown of the
total time spent to indicate the time legitimately and
necessarily spent. This, together with the fact that
only $2,167.99 was involved in the action, makes
an award of $3500.00 unreasonable, unconscionable
and an abuse of discretion by the court.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing arguments have shown that the
lower court was in error in granting judgment for
$3500.00 attorney's fees because:
( 1) There was no right to bring this foreclosure action in the first place and therefore no attorney's fees should be allowed for pursumg a nonexistent right;
(2 ) If there was initially a right to attorney's
fees, that right has been waived or is barred by
laches or estoppel because of the lapse of time, acceptance of later installments under the mortgage,
and failure to claim that right when appellants were
changing their position to their prejudice;
(3) The proceedings for the determination of
that right were irregular and invalid due to the lack
of notice and evidence of clerical error and the delay
in obtaining the nunc pro tune order and in bringing the matter before a different division of the court
than the one which originally heard the case ;
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( 4) There are no findings of fact upon the
essential issues raised by the pleadings or indicating
any right to bring this foreclosure action upon which
to base the court's judgment for attorney's fees;
( 5) The amount of the fee under the circumstances of this case is unreasonable, unconscionable
and constitutes an abuse of discretion by the court.
For these reasons the lower court's Judgment
of September 26, 1966, its Order Nunc Pro Tune of
October 19, 1966, and its Order of October 19, 1966,
denying appellants' Motion to Amend Findings of
Fact and for a New Trial, should all be reversed with
directions that the $3500.00 paid to respondents by
the clerk of the court be returned to the clerk and
disbursed to appellants.
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